The distinction between the beginning «in dubio pro reo» and the presumption of innocence in spanish criminal procedure

Published 2023-06-07
Section Derecho

Authors

  • Francisco Ortego Pérez U. De Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7770/rchdcp-V4N3-art649

Keywords:

Criminal procedure, Procedural principles, Presumption of innocence, Evidence, Reasonable doubt

Abstract

This article analyzes one of the most widely used principles in
criminal justice practice. Traditionally associated with the evaluation of evidence, currently the principle «in dubio pro reo» has lost its independent
significance due to its direct relation to the right to the presumption of innocence.

Author Biography

Francisco Ortego Pérez, U. De Barcelona

Académico. Profesor titular de Derecho Procesal, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona. Barcelona, España.

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